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The Significance of the "temple idea" in William Lethaby's Architecture, Mysticism and Myth
(1891)
by Deborah van der Plaat
In Architecture, Mysticism and Myth (1891), the English architect and theorist William
Lethaby (1857-1931) developed a syncretic theory of modern architectural invention
in which the subjective world of the 'imagined' is reconciled with the objective or
'known'. Lethaby's thesis was motivated by a desire to work the contrasts generated
from John Ruskin's (1819-1900) Victorian imagination into a systematic theory of
design. The vehicle which enabled this reconciliation was the temple idea, an
architectural construct demonstrating the two ways of seeing inherent in mythic
man's [sic] engagement with nature and its subsequent translation into the
architectural form. 
Introduction.
Published in the final months of 1891, Architecture, Mysticism and Myth (Fig. 1) was the first
architectural treatise written by the late nineteenth century English architect and theorist
William Richard Lethaby (1857-1931).[1] His goal, Lethaby tells us in the introductory
statement of the text, was to determine the future direction of stylistic developments in
architecture with the specific intention of identifying how the architect could develop an
artefact that would "excite and interest, both real and general"—by possessing "a symbolism
that was comprehensible [to] the great majority of spectators"—and be of "sweetness,
simplicity, freedom, confidence and light."[2] This could be achieved, he asserted, through
the study of the "temple idea," an architectural construct embodying mythic man's [sic] dual
conceptions of the natural world.[3] Drawing on a multiplicity of secondary sources within
the fields of ethnology, archaeology, mythography, philology, anthropology, architecture and
art history, Lethaby positioned the cosmological imagery of the temple idea as the original
motive underlying the architectural form.
Fig. 1, William Lethaby, Architecture, Mysticism and Myth, Percival, London, 1891, title page[larger
image]
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In 1928, three years prior to his death, Lethaby chose to rewrite Architecture, Mysticism and
Myth as a series of articles for the journal the Builder.[4] Revising the text, Lethaby
introduced a number of significant changes. He renamed the series Architecture, Nature and
Magic and he removed the introductory chapter, the theoretical core of the original text. He
also lamented that his original study was "very insufficient and in many ways feeble," a
criticism directed at his inexperienced use of sources and the fact that "second-rate and
second-hand authorities were mixed up with true sources" resulting in a "whole" that was
"uncritical and inexpert."[5] However, despite such misgivings Lethaby maintained that the
central hypothesis of the original text remained valid.
The main thesis, that the development of building practice and ideas of the world
structure acted and reacted on one another I still believe to be sound, and much of
the material brought together to give substance to the proposition is not without its
value.[6] 
Lethaby's reworking of Architecture, Mysticism and Myth can be interpreted as a response to
the reaction it had evoked amongst his contemporaries. While the reviewer for the 
Architectural Association Notes and The British Architect declared the text to be "the germ of
all noble building. . .a sign of the ripeness of the times" and "a full and true interpretation of
[architecture]"[7] others, were more critical. The reviewer for the popular journal the Builder
argued that the text failed to fulfil its stated objectives. Noting that the "moral" of the text
"is that architecture should still be designed in its highest forms, under the influence of, and
with some relation to the known and imagined facts of the universe," and "that it must have
a symbolism immediately comprehensible by a great body of spectators," he also observed
that, "of what kind and in what relation architecture must have to the 'facts of the universe'
as at present 'known,' Mr Lethaby does not define."[8] The reviewer for the Times, was
equally unsympathetic, dismissing the study as esoteric and "obscure."[9]
The uncertainty about Lethaby's core philosophy of architecture persists in more recent
attempts to assess the text by the present day historian. Godfrey Rubens in "The Life and
Work of William Richard Lethaby" (1977) has argued that the text is dogged by an inherent
"paradox" stemming from Lethaby's conflicting desire for a "rational symbolism" and an
interest in the transcendental thinking of his time.[10] Julian Holder, in "Architecture,
Mysticism and Myth and its influence" (1985) echoes Rubens, concluding that Lethaby's
fascination with mystery in architecture conflicts with his interest in narrative and the clarity
of story-telling.[11] Similarly, Trevor Garnham in "William Lethaby and the Problem of Style
in late Nineteenth Century English Architecture" (1980) argues that Lethaby's inability to
separate the pure idea of architecture" from the "compromising and physical processes of
building" fosters confusion and obfuscation.[12]
The conflict sensed by each of these authors stems, I would argue, from Lethaby's
simultaneous promotion of two contradictory propositions on architecture. One is that all
design is informed by universal principles; the other, that it is a continuous response to
changing conditions. Garnham, in his 1980 dissertation, has argued that the principal thesis
developed by Lethaby in Architecture, Mysticism and Myth is that "architecture is a pure
idea" compromised by the mechanical processes associated with building.[13] He has
attributed this conception of architecture to the influence on Lethaby of John Ruskin
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(1819-1900), and, in particular, to the latter's hierarchical isolation of architecture from the
mechanical realities of building.[14] The association of Architecture, Mysticism and Myth
with the doctrines of Ruskin is significant for a number of reasons. First, it binds the text to
a design tradition that associated the creative act with the Victorian Imagination, the mental
faculty described by Samuel Taylor Coleridge as possessing the "esemplastic" power to
shape, fuse and combine existing data to produce something new and unique. Thus, the
subject (the producer or user of the artefact) was established as the originator of form.[15]
Second, it suggests that Lethaby adhered to the belief that form was determined by
universal principles, as the actions of the imagination were perceived to be an index of the
divine laws determining all creation.[16] Finally, it fixed the text to a celebration of the past
or tradition, and more specifically to Ruskin's identification of the Gothic spirit as a
paradigmatic model for future practice.
By contrast, Charlotte Vestal Brown in her 1974 dissertation, "Architecture as Process,
Implications for a Methodology of History and Criticism," has argued that the true lesson of
Lethaby's text is that there is no constant canon of form but that architecture is a continual
response to changes in customs and conditions.[17] Thus, architecture is presented as
constantly evolving and in an ongoing process of flux and development; it is never static or
fixed.[18] The implications of Vestal Brown's study are twofold. Arguing that Lethaby links
the flux evident in the multiplicity of architectural styles to changes in physical and cultural
conditions, Vestal Brown implies that Lethaby identifies the material qualities of the object
and object world, rather than the subject, as the true catalyst for form. Secondly, she places
Architecture, Mysticism and Myth within a historicist movement, one that accepts the
achievements of each historical epoch as unique and specific to their time and place. This
conception of history also encourages those in the modern world to identify and build upon
the attributes characteristic of their own time rather than those of the past.[19] Both
tendencies are in direct conflict with the Ruskinian themes identified by Garnham as being
central to Lethaby's thesis.
Significantly, evidence for both propositions can be found in Architecture, Mysticism and
Myth. Noting that his intention was to "ask [what] are the ultimate facts behind all
architecture which has given it form," Lethaby argued that "behind every style of
architecture there is an earlier style, in which the germ of every form is to be found. . . ."
[20] He also asserts that "all architecture is one, when traced back through the streams of
civilisation."[21] Such statements support Garnham's claim that Lethaby's intention, like
Ruskin's before him, was to isolate from an ideal past, a universal set of principles which lay
at the core of "all" architecture. On the very same page as the above statements, however,
Lethaby also asserted that "all" in architecture "is the slow change of growth," that "it is
impossible to point to the time of invention of any custom or feature," and that "alterations.
. .may be traced to new conditions, or directly innovating thought in religion."[22] These
lines appear to bolster the reading given by Vestal Brown. These dual yet opposed
conceptions of architecture in Architecture, Mysticism and Myth, as Godfrey Rubens has
noted in William Richard Lethaby, His Life and Works, "make the book difficult to come to
terms with." They also demonstrate, to quote Rubens once again, the "paradox that was an
essential part of Lethaby's writing and complex personality."[23]
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The theoretical tension detected in Architecture, Mysticism and Myth stems from the
historian's focus on the cosmological symbols—the ziggurat, world mountain, labyrinth,
world tree, etc—and their architectural applications discussed by Lethaby. An alternative
reading, it is suggested, arises from a questioning of key concepts introduced in the
introductory essay. There, Lethaby examines, in more general terms, the outcome of
cosmological thinking and planning—"the temple idea"[24] —and the conceptual strategy
that motivates it. He identifies this as the desire to represent both the "known" and the
"imagined facts of the universe." An examination of these two terms—the "known" and the
"imagined"—and their debt to earlier architectural theory is useful as it demonstrates that
the "paradox" detected in Lethaby's work is in fact an attempt to develop a systematic and
syncretic theory by drawing together two seemingly divergent modes of seeing and
representing nature, and in turn, the methods of architectural invention they suggest.[25]
Architecture, Mysticism and Myth and the "temple idea."
In the opening paragraphs of the introduction to Architecture, Mysticism and Myth Lethaby
clearly outlined his objectives. Noting that his intention was "to ask [what] are the ultimate
facts behind all architecture which has [sic] given it form," he isolated three key principles.
First, the similar needs and desires of men; secondly, on the side of structure, the
necessities imposed by materials, and the physical laws of their erection and
combination; and thirdly, on the side of style, nature.[26] 
"It is [of] the last" of these, Lethaby tells us, "that I propose to write." He then proceeds to
explain what he intended by the terms "style" and "nature." It is, he wrote:
the influence of the known and imagined facts of the universe on architecture, the
connection between the world as structure, and the building, not of mere details of
nature and the ornaments of architecture, but of the whole—the Heavenly Temple and
the Earthly Tabernacle.[27] 
In this statement, Lethaby clearly equated architecture, or more specifically form, with the
natural world. Lethaby then proceeded to divide the representation of nature into two
categories of knowledge or different modes of perception. He described these as the
"known" and the "imagined facts" of the universe. In making this distinction, Lethaby
allowed for the possibility that nature could be interpreted in two different but equally valid
ways and that these in turn acted on building practice. The focus of his examination was the
cosmological myths of the ancient world. For Lethaby, the significance of such constructs
was their reliance on both conceptions of nature. Working on the assumption that "the
development of building practices and ideas of the world structure acted and reacted upon
one another,"[28] Lethaby isolated the "temple idea" as demonstrating a tradition that
readily accommodated a dual conception.
The "known facts" of nature, Lethaby claimed, are material objects which can be seen or
physically experienced, such as trees, mountains, the sky, and the sea. Such known facts,
he explained, offered ancient man concrete allegorical images of what could not be seen or
directly experienced. "The unknown universe," he argued, "could only be. . .explained in
terms of its known parts; the earth shut in by the night sky, . . .a tree, a tent, a building."
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[29] These in turn, Lethaby maintained, were used to "form. . .world system[s]" for "peoples
[then] living."[30] The simple and observable fact of "a tree with wide over-arching
branches", Lethaby concluded, "must have formed an apt and satisfactory explanation" of
the universe in general, as "legends of [the] world tree are so widely distributed."[31]
Similar uses of the "mountain" and "built chamber" also appear to have been popular, as
they, like the tree, Lethaby explained, are prolific in the cosmological myths of the ancient
world.[32]
The presence of "known facts" in cosmological myths demonstrates that ancient man based
his understanding of the world around him, at least in the first instance, on what he visually
witnessed within the material world. Thus, the mythic mind extracted knowledge from the
contemplation and study of an object world, which existed outside of the subject, and was
autonomous and independent of that subject. Working on Herbert Spencer's assumption that
"given the data as known to him, the inference drawn by the primitive man is the reasonable
inference,"[33] Lethaby felt that this aspect of ancient man's response to nature was
comparable to the scientific methodologies adopted by modern man.
If we erase from the mind absolutely all that science has laboriously spied out of the
actual facts of the material universe, and ask ourselves what would have been the
thoughts by which man attempted at first to explain and image forth the natural
order, we may put ourselves in sympathy with notions that at first seem absurd. We
may see that the progress of science is merely the framing and destruction one by
one of a series of hypotheses, and that the early cosmogonies are one in kind with the
widest generalisations of science—from certain appearance to frame a theory of
explanation, from phenomena to generalised law.[34] 
Arriving at conclusions, which were driven by methods comparable to those produced by
modern science's contemplation of relative phenomena, the inference was that mythic man's
reliance on "known facts" produced a world-view that was also relative. Mythic man's
understanding of the world fluxed and evolved as the data and belief systems (mythologies)
he gathered accumulated.
However, the world-view cultivated by the mythic mind, Lethaby argued, did not rely solely
on the "known." In an attempt to explain the unknown—that is, phenomena that could not
be seen or directly experienced—mythic man employed known facts (the tree, the mountain,
and the built chamber) to explain the unknown, such as the order of the cosmos. Thus
"known facts," such as the tree, were transformed by ancient man into "imagined facts." The
tree, a fact extracted from the observable, material world, was transformed into the "world
tree," a fact that had no validity but in the imagination of the subject. These imagined facts
of "world tree," "world mountain" and "world chamber" in turn provided the foundation for
complete cosmological systems. As Lethaby explained, "the Chaldean inscriptions described.
. .a tree as growing at the centre of the world; its branches of crystal formed the sky and
drooped to the sea" while "the Phoenicians thought the world like a revolving tree, over
which was spread a vast tapestry of blue embroidered stars."[35] Others saw the,
earth [as] a mountain,. . .around its base flows the ocean. . .;beyond is a high range
of mountains which form the walls of the enclosure, and on these is either laid the
ceiling in one great slab, or it is domed. . . . The firmament is sustained by the earth
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mountain in the centre. . ."the earth with the sea supported by it, rests upon pillars,
and covers an under-world accessible by various entrances from the sea, as well as
from mountain clefts. Above the earth an upper world is found, beyond which the blue
sky, being of solid consistence, vaults itself like an outer shell, and, as some say,
revolves around some high mountain top in the far north."[36] 
The significance of the "imagined" was that it demonstrated a shift in the perceptual
strategies adopted by mythic man. The "known facts" which were based on the observation
of the object world, a world which was autonomous and independent of the subject, were
transformed into the imagined, and, thus, originating within the inner resources of that
same subject. In transforming the "known" into the "imagined," so that man could come to
some understanding of the unknown, the mythic cosmologies of the ancient world
demonstrated a dual reliance on the scrutiny of an independent object world and on the
inner, mental and imaginative resources of the subject. The passive act of observation of the
known was transformed into a creative act. In possessing both "known" and "imagined
facts," the universe for mythic man was both subjective and objective, and the strategies he
adopted to understand this world were both passive or contemplative and active or
inventive.[37]
The importance of this transformation of the "known" into the "imagined", however, lay not
only in a dual reliance on knowledge originating in the object and the subject. It also
indicated a movement from "phenomena" to "generalised law"; from the relative to the fixed
and universal.[38] A key attribute of the "imagined" was that it appeared to point to beliefs
that were common to multiple cultures, times and places; to a core body of knowledge that
was universal and valid for all.[39] A distinguishing feature of the "world tree," Lethaby
explained, was that it was common to multiple cultures; being found not only in the
inscriptions of the Chaldeans, but in the writings of the Phoenicians, and "later tomes of
culture."[40] Similar conclusions could be drawn for the "world mountain" or "world
chamber". "The Egyptian system," noted Lethaby, "compared the sky to the ceiling of an
edifice," as did the "old poet Job" who described the cosmos as a "vast box whose lid is the
sky." At the centre of Job's box rose "the earth mountain," which acted as the "prop and the
pivot of [the world's] evolutions."[41] Similar examples, Lethaby continues, could be found
in the cosmogonic theories of the Rig Veda, as well as other early writings.[42]
Lethaby's objective in Architecture, Mysticism and Myth was to document the universality of
such "imagined" facts. Working on the assumption that form is dependent on the
representation of nature, he also argued that imagined facts represent an essential core or
set of principles that motivate form. In the introduction of the text, Lethaby pointed out that
his aim was to identify what was common and universal, to,
attempt to set out, from the architect's point of view, the basis of certain ideas
common in the architecture of many lands and religions, the purposes behind
structure and form which may be called the esoteric principles of architecture.[43] 
Noting that "it has, rightly, been the habit of historians of architecture to lay stress on the
differences of the several styles and schools of successive ages," he also argued that it was
equally valid to consider the alternative; that "in the far larger sense, all architecture is one,
when traced back through the stream of civilisations, as they followed or influenced one
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another."[44] Lethaby's search for the universal—observing that "behind every style of
architecture there is an earlier style, in which the germ of every form is to be found"—and
his association of such facts with the "imagined," established the importance of the past and
the significance of traditional values.[45] However, Lethaby also concluded that nature, and
thus architecture, cannot be read solely in terms of the "imagined" but must also respond to
the "known"—the varied objects and conditions which constitute the material world and
inform human culture. Thus while the "imagined" maintained the integrity of tradition, the
"known" established the validity of change, progress and evolution, and thus offered an
explanation for,
such alternations as may be traced to new conditions, or directly innovating thought
in religion, [and] all [that] is the slow change of growth, [so that] it is almost
impossible to point to the time of invention of any custom or feature. As Herbert
Spencer says of ceremonial [sic] generally: "adhering tenaciously to all his elders
taught him, the primitive man deviates into novelty only through unintended
modifications. Every one knows that languages are not devised but evolve; and the
same is true of usages."[46] 
Lethaby presented this dual reliance on the "known" and "imagined" as being a unique and
admirable attribute of the mythic mind and mythic world system. It is only "at the dawn of
record" and in the "'wild in woods' [where] the savage runs," Lethaby observed, that we find
such dual conceptions of nature.[47] Such duality is also presented as an attribute of the
architectures produced by such peoples. Drawing the reader's attention to the ancient
mythological construct of the "temple idea," Lethaby argued that in the first instance it
functioned as a direct imitation of the pre-established and presumably "imagined" order of
nature. The underlying objective of the temple idea, he explained, "was to set up a local
reduplication of the temple not made with hands, the World Temple itself—a sort of model to
scale."[48] However, for Lethaby, such "imagined facts" represented only half of the
equation. Of equal importance were facts extracted from the "known" which were based on a
direct observation and documentation of the object world. The temple idea also
demonstrated this second, more arbitrary aspect of form. While the form and construction of
the temple imitated the fixed order of the "World Temple" it also responded to the "science
of the time." It was, as Lethaby explained,
an observatory, and an almanack. Its foundation was a sacred ceremony, the time
carefully chosen by augury, and its relation to the heavens defined by observation.
[49] 
Agreeing with the French anthropologist De la Saussaye, Lethaby concluded that the "temple
idea" not only "refer[red] to the structure of the world," one that was imagined and thus
universal, but also spoke of "the religious relationship of men to the gods," conditions that
were specific to the time, place and culture.[50]
In the closing paragraphs of the introductory chapter Lethaby draws his discussion of the
temple idea into the present day by suggesting that his contemporaries, like the builders of
the mythic world, should ground their design practice in contemporary readings of the
physical universe. Modern architectural invention, he suggested, was equally dependent on
the dual representation of the "known"—the need to address the changing conditions
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imposed by the object world, both physical and cultural—and the imagined—the expression
of the internal inventions of the subject. In subsequent writings he reiterated this conclusion
by arguing that architecture must "once again," reconcile "Science"—"all that had been spied
out of the actual facts of the universe"—with "Art"—the "imaginative, poetic, even mystic
and magic."[51] Only then would it regain the cultural relevance and meaning it once held.
[52]
Ruskin and the subjectivity of the Victorian Imagination. 
Lethaby's use of "mysticism" in the title of his text and his association in the preface "of the
purpose behind structure and form" with the "esoteric principles of architecture" encourage
the historian to link Lethaby's thesis with transcendental and arcane traditions of thought.
The difficulty with such an argument is that Lethaby himself rejected such associations. In
1928, he noted that "there was little or nothing in the book about mysticism" and that he
had simply included it in his title for the "jingle of words, after the manner of Andrew Lang's 
Myth, Ritual and Religion."[53] Lethaby's statement is validated by a series of notations in a
small notebook now held in the St Martin's Art and Design Archive in London where he refers
to his book on a number of occasions simply as "Architecture and Myth."[54] An analysis of
the two concepts at the core of Lethaby's thesis—the known and the imagined—and the
recognition that each refers to alternate world views, one subjective and the other objective,
reinforces this conclusion by suggesting that the motive for the text lies closer to home. An
obvious source is the observation by the English critic John Ruskin that two different modes
of seeing, represented by the faculties of the Imagination and Fancy, could be employed by
the artist when viewing and portraying the landscape.
Ruskin's discussion of the Imagination and Fancy was undertaken in a number of his texts
including the second volume of Modern Painters (1846) and the first three volumes of the 
Stones of Venice (1851-1853).[55] One of his most articulate explanations of these two
faculties, however, is found in a letterwritten to Rev. W. L. Brown, in 1847. He writes:
There was a time when the sight of a steep hill covered with pines, cutting against the
sky, would have touched me with an emotion inexpressible, which, in the endeavour
to communicate in its truth and intensity, I must have sought for all kinds of far-off,
wild, and dreamy images. Now I can look at such a slope with coolness, and
observation of fact. I see that it slopes at 20° or 25°; I know the pines are spruce fir
—"Pinus nigra"—of such and such an age; that the rocks are slate of such and such a
formation; the soil, thus, and thus; the day fine, the sky blue. All this I can at once
communicate in so many words, and this is all which is necessarily seen. But it is not
all the truth; there is something else to be seen there, which I cannot see but in a
certain condition of mind, nor can I make any one else see it, but by putting him into
that condition, and my endeavour in description would be, not to detail the facts of
the scene, but by any means whatsoever to put my hearer's mind into the same 
ferment as my mind.[56] 
Ruskin's distinction between what is merely seen and its imitation, and what is felt—"the
ferment of mind"—and the need to capture and in some way replicate this experience
through the literary or artistic process can be attributed to his debt to the Romantic theory
of the "IMAGINATION;" a mental faculty defined by the poet Samuel Taylor Coleridge
(1772-1834) in 1817 as the "living Power and prime Agent of all human perception."
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Rejecting the empiricist assumption that the mind was a tabula rasa on which external
experiences and sense impressions were imprinted, stored, recalled, and combined through
a process of association, Coleridge divided the "mind" into two distinct faculties.[57] He
labelled these the "Imagination" and "Fancy."
The IMAGINATION then, I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary
IMAGINATION I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception,
and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I AM.
The secondary Imagination I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the
conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and
differing only in degree, and in the mode of operation. It dissolves, diffuses,
dissipates, in order to recreate; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still
at all events it struggles to idealise and unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects
(as objects) are essentially fixed and dead. FANCY, on the contrary, has no other
counters to play with, but fixities and definites. The Fancy is indeed no other than a
mode of Memory emancipated from the order of time and space; while it is blended
with, and modified by that empirical phenomenon of the will, which we express by the
word CHOICE. But equally with the ordinary memory the Fancy must receive all its
materials ready made from the law of association.[58] 
"Fancy," in Coleridge's eyes was employed for tasks that were "passive" and "mechanical",
the accumulation of fact and documentation of what is seen. "Always the ape," Fancy,
Coleridge argued, was "too often the adulterator and counterfeiter of memory."[59] The
Imagination on the other hand was "vital" and transformative, "a repetition in the finite mind
of the eternal act of creation." For Coleridge, it was the Imagination that was responsible for
acts that were truly creative and inventive and, in turn, that identified true instances of fine
or noble art.[60]
Ruskin maintained Coleridge's division of the mind. In the second volume of his Modern
Painters (1846), he dedicated almost one hundred pages to the subject of the Imagination,
adopting a terminology and intent that was reminiscent of Coleridge.[61] However, as Susan
Gurewitsch has argued in her essay "Golgonooza on the Grand Canal: Ruskin's Stones of
Venice and the Romantic Imagination" (1981), Ruskin was never satisfied with these early
attempts to define the imagination and it is only in the later publications of the 1850s, and
specifically the first three volumes of the Stones of Venice (1851-1853), that the issue is
resolved.[62] Like Coleridge before him, the distinction made by Ruskin between Fancy and
the Imagination rested on the fact that Fancy was concerned with the mechanical operations
of the mind, those which are responsible for the passive accumulation of data and the
storage of such data in the memory. Imagination, on the other hand, described the
"mysterious power," which extracted from such data, "hidden ideas and meaning." It also
determined "the various operations of constructive and inventive genius."[63] In the fourth
volume of Modern Painters (1856), Ruskin explained this distinction.
Imagine all that any of these men had seen or heard in the whole course of their
lives, laid up accurately in their memories as in vast storehouses, extending, with the
poets, even to the slightest intonations of syllables heard in the beginning of their
lives, and with the painters, down to minute folds of drapery, and shapes of leaves or
stones; and over all of this unindexed and immeasurable mass of treasure, the
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imagination brooding and wandering, but dream-gifted, so as to summon at any
moment exactly such groups of ideas as shall fit each other: this I conceive to be the
real nature of the imaginative mind.[64] 
The significance of the Imagination for Coleridge was that it represented the sole faculty
within man that was able to achieve the romantic ambition of reuniting the subject and the
object; the world of the self and the world of nature. By establishing the creative act as
mimicking the "organic principle" or "one"—a divine principle believed to underlie all reality—
the romantic theorist sought to establish a harmonious relationship between the ideal world
of the subject and the real world of the object. Baker has demonstrated that Coleridge was
convinced that the Imagination acted as "a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of
creation in the infinite I AM," and that it not only reinforced the notion that perception was
active and creative, it established the cosmos as an organic entity.[65]
Coleridge explained this property of the "Imagination" as "ESEMPLASTIC," to "shape into
one" and to "convey a new sense."[66] The key attribute of the esemplastic function, Engell
has argued, was that it ensured that,
all the arteries of life and thought returned to the heart after dividing into invisible
capillaries. The subjective and objective poles intertwine and fuse, spirit informs
matter and the dynamic synthesis and coalescence of both systems occurs.[67] 
However, while the objective of the romantic critic was to facilitate a synthesis of subject
and object and to unite the ideal and real, the "active" and "creative" powers given to the
Romantic Imagination guaranteed that no such synthesis could take place. Rather, the
theory of perception demonstrated by the idea of the Imagination allows the subject to
subsume the identity and autonomy of the object.[68] The relationship between the subject
and nature, in such an instance, Paul de Man has demonstrated in "The Rhetoric of
Temporality" (1969),
is superseded by an intersubjective, interpersonal relationship that, in the last
analysis, is a relationship of the subject towards itself. Thus the priority has passed
from the outside world entirely within the subject, and we end up with something that
resembles radical idealism.[69] 
Sprinker in "Ruskin on the Imagination" (1979), has described this phenomenon as,
man's inexorable will to power over reality. To look upon nature and behold there an
image of the mind which is not necessarily evidence for a preordained harmony
between mind and nature. Though the rhetoric of the Romantic may tend to blur the
distinction between subject and object, the distinction is not thereby annulled. . . . the
aesthetics of romanticism was an indication of the profoundest dissatisfaction with
reality, the sign of a peculiar sort of nihilism in which the wish to integrate the self
and nature was merely a disguise for the imperialistic designs of the imagination on
the real world.[70] 
Attempting to "make the senses out of the mind—not the mind out of the senses,"
Coleridge's system of perception, like that of his romantic colleagues, ensured that thought
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and reality grow indistinguishable, like two sounds of which no man can positively say which
is the echo. In such a system our intelligent self-consciousness becomes inseparable from
our perceptions of the world.
The "fallacy" of Coleridge's belief—that a synthesis of the subject and object could be
obtained while the identity of each was maintained—was one, Sprinker argued, that Ruskin
acknowledged. It was also one that he avoided. Thus, while Coleridge's idea of the
Imagination demonstrated an attempt to unify subject and object, Ruskin's theory of the
Imagination was designed to demonstrate the profound and irreducible gulf that separated
the object—the world of facts, things as they are in themselves—from the subject—the
perception of facts by human consciousness—within the Romantic world- view. Accepting
that we can never really know the true nature of the object world for itself, and thus are
unable to even "fathom the mystery of a single flower," Ruskin's exploration of the
imagination, as Sprinker has demonstrated, was to offer a "strident rebuttal of the
positivistic tendencies of nineteenth-century thought" and to produce a "defence [for] the
imagination against the prevailing devaluation of its importance in the modern world."[71]
"The most curious, yet most common deficiency of the modern contemplative mind," Ruskin
stated in "The Three Colours of Pre-Raphaelitism" (1878), "is its inability to comprehend that
phenomena of true imagination are yet no less real and often more vivid than phenomena of
matter."[72] It was this, the need for "noble art" to reflect the "phenomena of true
imagination," which Ruskin sought to articulate in his critical writings on art and
architecture.
Defining "Art" as a "divinely imagined thing" and identifying the creative act which elevates
the artefact to a fine art—be it a painted image, architectural structure or literary text—with
a "certain condition of mind" that "groups ideas" and "reveals the unseen," John Ruskin
promoted a theory of invention which privileged the subject, the producer or user of the
artefact.[73] For Ruskin, the role of the object (be it the multiplicity of objects which made
up the material world or the architectural artefact) was simply to demonstrate "the
perception or conception of the mental or bodily powers by which the work was produced."
[74] Ruskin established, with these convictions, the intrinsic qualities of the artefact (the
object) as being bound to and determined by the subject; the user or producer of the
artefact. He also effectively subjugated the importance of the artefact and its physical
properties within the creative process.[75]
While Ruskin cultivated a thesis which privileged the world of the subject and the
imagination, his writings often appeared to contradict such a conclusion. This is a fact that
Ruskin himself openly acknowledged. In a footnote in the fifth volume of Modern Painters
(1860), he writes:
I do not wonder at people sometimes thinking I contradict myself when they come suddenly
on any of the scattered passages, in which I am forced to insist on the opposite practical
applications of subtle principles. . . . It would be well if you would first glance over the
chapter on Finish in the third volume. . . The general conclusion reached in that chapter
being that finish, for the sake of added truth, or utility, or beauty, is noble; but finish, for the
sake of workmanship, neatness, or polish, ignoble—turn to the fourth chapter of The Seven
Lamps, where you will find the Campanile of Giotto given as a model and mirror of perfect
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architecture, just on account of its exquisite completion. Also, in the next chapter, I
expressly limit the delightfulness of rough and imperfect work to developing and unformed
schools.[76]
In the same footnote, Ruskin goes on to cite a passage from The Stones of Venice where he
concludes, "the demand for perfection is always a misunderstanding of the end of art." He
then juxtaposes this comment with a later chapter on the early Renaissance where he
argues "the profoundest respect [is] paid to completion."[77]
Philipa Davis in "Arnold or Ruskin?" (1992), has argued that the development of such
opposing statements by Ruskin is intentional.[78] Having set up an apparent maze of
contradictions, Ruskin tells us that his objective was to bring the reader "into a wholesome
state of knowing what to think."
Now all these passages are perfectly true; and, as in much more serious matters, the
essential thing for the reader to receive their truth, however little he may be able to
see their consistency. If truths of apparently contradictory character are candidly and
rightly received, they will fit themselves together in the mind without any trouble. But
no truth maliciously received will nourish you or fit with others.[79] 
This aspect within Ruskin's writings—the seemingly intentional cultivation of inconsistent
positions—peaked Lethaby's interest. Noting that it was the element of "paradox" in Ruskin
which most appealed to him, as it "shocked people into thinking" and "but for that they
would have remained wholly indifferent to art," Lethaby embraced this element of Ruskin's
work.[80] However, while Lethaby celebrated the tension evident in Ruskin, he also sought
to resolve it.[81] For Lethaby, the equitable balance of the known and the imagined,
articulated by the mythic construct of the temple idea, offered a pragmatic resolution to this
problem.
Conclusion.
Lethaby was familiar with ideas of both Ruskin and Coleridge.[82] His thesis of creation,
however, differs from those of Ruskin and Coleridge in that it fails to assert the primacy of
either the subject or object but presents both as having an equal role in the creation of the
architectural form. In Architecture, Mysticism and Myth the temple idea is presented as
being reliant on both the ideal or "imagined" image of the cosmos—"the temple not made
with hands" or "World Temple"—and the "known"; "its form governed by the science of the
time; . . .an observatory. . .an almanack."[83] With this example, Lethaby argued that both
cognitive strategies, one passive and accumulative, the other active and formative,
contributed to the perceptual and creative act.
Lethaby confirmed this conviction in later writings. In the essay, "What Shall we call
Beautiful" (1918) he writes that,
it is a trite truth that we have never really seen a thing, a tree, for instance, but only
partial aspects of many trees. Even these partial aspects are conditioned by our
relations in time and space. They are images which arise between the object, tree,
and you, the observer. If, for instance, the seasons were hurried up and became a
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thousand times quicker, we should see our tree bud, spread out its leaves and fade in
an afternoon—it would gush out like a fountain into green and be gone. It is changing
all the time now, but we do not see it. Again, if it were magnified several thousand
times, its solidity would dissolve into a vague fog form. Its colour, green, is partly in
the leaves, partly in the light, but most in our eyes. What, apart from our ways of
apprehending it, can a tree be, the thing in itself? All we know of it is struck out by
the contact of a 'thing' and our senses. 'Tree' is not objective or subjective. Turning
from such 'material' and 'tangible' objects to our generalised ideas on the aspect
which possess the qualities that we call Beauty, we find that phenomena are
conditioned by a great number of still more complex and confusing factors. They
involve many questions in regard to what we see, what we think we see, when we
see, and who does the seeing. Doubtless the executioner thought of his fine new rack,
'That is a beauty;' but what did the executee think?[84] 
In being neither subjective or purely imagined, nor objective or simply known, the "temple 
idea," much like the tree, captured the "great number of still more complex and confusing
factors" which, Lethaby felt, determined what we see, think, and identify as being beautiful.
Like the tree, the "temple idea" "was neither subjective nor objective," but both. Seeking to
establish the entity of both the "known" and the "imagined"—of the objective and subjective
—rather than a romantic synthesis, Lethaby maintained, at least theoretically, the balance of
Fancy and Imagination which Coleridge was denied. His departure from Ruskin, on the other
hand, is found in the fact that he did not privilege the subjective Imagination over objective
Fancy. Rather, the two, in Lethaby's eyes, offered equally valid world-views and thus both
were essential to the architectural form. It is this central thesis which Lethaby articulates
through the "temple idea" as it is presented in Architecture, Mysticism and Myth.
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"freedom of thought" of the individual "workman who struck the stone."(Ruskin, "The Nature
of Gothic," in Works, vol. 10, pp. 183, 198-9.) In honouring the subject, Ruskin's intention
was to extract from the flux of every day phenomena "laws" or "essential principles" that were
"consistent" and "eternal." ("Inaugural Lecture on Art," and "Relation of Art to Religion," 
Works, vol. 20, pp. 39, 53-54.) Arguing that there are "certain elementary principles of right,
in every picture and design," and that "everything which men rightly accomplish is indeed
done by Divine help," and "under a consistent law which is never departed from," Ruskin
concluded that both art and architecture must always be "executed in compliance with
constant laws of right, [that they] cannot be singular and must be distinguished only by
excellence in what is always desirable." (Works, vol. 20, pp. 26 54, 33) The "desirable" Ruskin
explained, was a universal code of "morality" or "the law of rightness in human conduct."(
Works, vol. 20, p. 49.) Thus the highest function of art was to relate to us "the utmost
ascertainable truth respecting visible things and moral feelings: and this pursuit of fact is the
vital element of the art power,—that in which alone, it can develop itself to its utmost." (
Works, vol. 20, p. 46)
[75] This negation of the object is demonstrated by Ruskin's theory of savagery or roughness
in the architectural ornament. For Ruskin such qualities revealed the working imagination of
the artisan and his freedom to think and create, and inevitably, to make mistakes. When the
desire for perfection in design, finish or utility was given precedence, Ruskin argued the
artisan became enslaved and his liberty to freely invent removed. Ruskin, "The Nature of
Gothic," 1853, Works, vol. 10, pp. 188-90
[76] Ruskin, "Modern Painters," vol. 5, 1860, Works, vol. 7, pp. 356-57n.
[77] Ruskin, "Modern Painters," vol 5, Works, vol. 7, pp. 356-57n.
[78] Philipa Davis, "Arnold or Ruskin?," Journal of Literature and Theology, 6, (December
1992), p. 334. However Davis also argues that these contradictions are of little consequence
as they fail to subjugate Ruskin's principal thesis, that the moral will always identifies the
good.
[79] Ruskin, "Modern Painters," vol. 5, Works, vol. 7, p. 358n. Davis, "Arnold or Ruskin?," pp.
334-45.
[80] Sir Reginald Blomfield, "W.R. Lethaby: An Impression and Tribute," Journal of the Royal
Institute of British Architects, 39 (1932), p. 6.
[81] For Ruskin the resolution of such conflicts was enabled by the imagination. "This is
imagination. . . . By its operation, two ideas are chosen out of an infinite mass. . .two ideas
17
Plaat: The Significance of the "temple idea" in William Lethaby‘s Architecture, Mysticism and Myth (1891)
Nineteenth-Century Art Worldwide, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Spring 2004)
which are separately wrong, which together shall be right, and whose unity, therefore, the
idea must be formed at the instant they are seized at, it is only in unity that either is good,
and therefore only the conception of that unity can prompt the preference. Now what is that
prophetic action of mind. . .?" (Ruskin, Works, vol. 4, pp. 234-45) However, this resolution is
never found in Ruskin as his thesis relied, as Kristine Ottesen Garrigan has argued, on fixed
contrasts. Thus while Ruskin does fluctuate between a privileging of the subject and the
object, as demonstrated by his shifting opinion on finish and roughness, and works on the
"hope" that the "two" positions "may fit themselves in the mind" of the reader "without any
trouble," the moral basis of his central thesis, and the suggestion of a singular right and
wrong which it facilitates, prevents any such resolution. It is ultimately the subject (the divine
principle represented by the imagination) which is given primacy in Ruskin's system. Kristene
Ottesen Garrigan, Ruskin on Architecture: His Thought and Influence (Wisconsin: The
University of Wisconsin Press, 1973), p. 41.
[82] Lethaby's essays which pre-date Architecture, Mysticism and Myth demonstrate his
knowledge of Ruskin. Lethaby's writings and notebooks also indicate that he was familiar with
Coleridge's ideas on the imagination. In his 1890 essay, "Of the ';Motive' in Architectural
Design," he directly cites Coleridge noting that: "You must (to quote Coleridge) have a lantern
in your hand to give light, otherwise all the materials in the world are useless, for you cannot
find them, and if you could, you could not arrange them. It is the "principle of selection," this
expression of our instinct for order and beauty, life, and right, which no formula will make
clear—but once seen, we feel there is a common instinct for its enjoyment, and call it "art" or
"style"—it is this alone which expressed in building, is Architecture." Lethaby, "Of the "Motive
in Architectural Design," Architectural Association Notes, 4 (1889), p. 24. See also Lethaby,
"Cast Iron and its Treatment for Artistic Purposes," Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, 38
(1890), pp. 272-82. Abrams has argued that the term lamp or lantern in Romantic literature
referred to the perceived shift in romantic theories of creation from mimesis, where the artist
mirrored what "he" saw around him, to the lamp, where the artist becomes the source or
originator of form. M.H. Abrams The Mirror and the Lamp: Romantic Theory and the Critical
Tradition (London: Oxford University Press, 1953).
[83] Lethaby, Architecture, Mysticism and Myth, p. 14.
[84] William Lethaby, "What shall we call beautiful- A practical view of Aesthetics," Hibbert
Journal, April (1918) reprinted in Lethaby, Form in Civilisation, p. 148.
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Illustrations
Fig. 1, William Lethaby, Architecture, Mysticism and Myth, Percival, London, 1891, title page[return to
text]
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